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liable, as a matter of policy, to discourage negligence and deter future
harm. The burden arising from the potential duration of liability is offset
not only by the policy of discouraging negligence, but also by the fact
that the architect enters into an undertaking for personal profit that may
affect the interests of others, with full realization of the possible conse-
quences.
Considering the Montijo case and its predecessors, and projecting its
ramifications, it seems reasonably certain that the California courts will
hold an architect liable to third persons injured as a result of his negligence
in the preparation of plans and specifications. Holding the architect to a
duty of care to foreseeable plaintiffs would seem the sensible method of
placing the loss on the party at fault. But the architect does not warrant
to the world that his work is sufficient in all respects. He is liable only for
those defects which result from his failure to exercise ordinary care-"the
care ordinarily exercised in like cases by reputable members of his pro-
fession practicing in the same locality."3
William R. Benz*
38Paxton v. Alameda County, 119 Cal. App. 2d 393, 398, 259 P.2d 934, 938 (1953).
* Member, Second Year Class.
USE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY IN ATTORNEY MALPRACTICE CASES
Although attorney liability for negligence has been frequently litigated,1
the use of expert opinion evidence has been minimal. In most jurisdictions
expert testimony is admissible when offered, but apparently neither party
has often thought such testimony useful. Perhaps in part this has been
because the attorney's skills have been considered more within the ambit
of the layman's experience and knowledge than the skills of other profes-
sionals. 2 As a result, in most cases the layman has been thought as well
qualified to pass judgment on the conduct of an attorney as one who is
experienced in the practice of law. Although this may have been reason-
able in the past, when the practice of law was relatively uncomplicated,
the laymen cannot of his own knowledge and experience judge what con-
duct is reasonable for the attorney trained and experienced in the involved
and often highly specialized practices of today.
While the use of expert testimony in attorney malpractice litigation has
not been extensive in most jurisdictions,3 it has been non-existent in Cali-
1 See Annot., 45 A.L.R.2d 14 (1956).
2 Expert testimony has been held admissible to show that specified conduct does or
does not breach the standard of care for other professionals and quasi-professionals. See
L. B. Laboratories, Inc. v. Mitchel, 237 P.2d 84, reversed on other grounds, 39 Cal. 2d
56, 244 P.2d 385 (1952) (C.P.A.); Huffman v. Lindquist, 37 Cal. 2d 465, 234 P.2d 34,
29 A.L.R.2d 485 (1951) (doctor); Paxton v. County of Alameda, 119 Cal. App. 2d 393,
259 P.2d 934 (1953) (architect).
3 See Annot., 45 A.L.R.2d 14 (1956).
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fornia. The leading case in Californa, Gambert v. Hart,4 held that the
question of an attorney's negligence is one of law and that the testimony
of another attorney as to whether the defendant's conduct was negligent
is inadmissible. The reasons for both these results in Gambert are unclear
and have led to confusion in later cases5 and secondary research sources. 6
It is suggested that the court erred in saying that the issue of an attorney's
negligence is a question of law for the court, and in view of the specialized
nature of the legal profession of today, a re-examination of the view that
expert testimony is inadmissible is in order.
In Gambert the negligence imputed to the defendant was, first, his
failure to file and serve a proper notice of a motion for a new trial; second,
his submission of the motion before the statement in support of it had
been settled or agreed to. On appeal the California Supreme Court said,
"The facts being admitted or proved, it was a question of law for the
Court whether they establish negligence in the defendant."7 Other cases
have said that the question of an attorney's negligence is one of fact.8
Neither statement is accurate since as in other negligence cases, the ques-
tion is a mixed one of law and fact.9 The broad question of whether par-
ticular conduct of an attorney is negligent requires an answer to two
narrower questions: What is the standard of care? Has the conduct in
question fallen short of that standard?
It is well recognized that the standard is always determined by the
court as a matter of law.1o Where a jury has not been waived the court
will instruct that the defendant is to be held to a duty of ordinary care or
extraordinary care under the particular circumstances.' Whether particu-
444 Cal. 542 (1872).
5 E.g., Floro v. Lawton, 187 Cal. App. 2d 657, 10 Cal. Rptr. 98 (1960). The court
here decided that the question of attorney negligence was one of law for the court and
that this was the law in California though a minority view.
6 In 7 Am. JuR. 2d Attorneys At Law § 189 (1963), the reporter states that "the
degree of care required of an attorney is a question of law .. . but the care actually
exercised in a given situation is a question of fact to be determined by the jury under
proper instructions by the court." Gambert is cited as "exemplifying these principles."
In Annot., 45 A.L.R.2d 14 (1956), it is stated that expert testimony in Gambert was
excluded as testimony as to the ultimate fact in issue. Annot., 1917B L.R.A. 11, cites
Gambert for the proposition that whether an attorney has been negligent in the perform-
ance of his duties is usually a question for the jury. See also Wade, The Attorney's Lia-
bility for Negligence, 12 VArm. L. REv. 755, 766 (1959), where the author cites Gambert
as holding the question of attorney negligence to be one of law. The author dismisses
the case as "rare" but cites no California cases as holding the question to be one of fact.
744 Cal. at 549.
8 O'Neill v. Gray, 30 F.2d 776 (1929); Pinkston v. Arrington, 98 Ala. 489, 13 So.
561 (1892); Hampel-Lawson Mercantile Co. v. Poe, 169 Ark. 840, 277 S.W. 29 (1925);
Olson v. North, 276 ]11. App. 457 (1934); Walpole's Adm'r v. Carlisle, 32 Ind. 415
(1869); Cochrane v. Little, 71 Md. 323, 18 At. 698 (1889); McCullough v. Sullivan,
102 N.J.L. 381, 132 Atl. 102 (1926); Werle v. Rumsey, 278 N.Y. 186, 15 N.E.2d 572
(1938); Hamsher v. Kline, 57 Pa. 397 (1868); Patterson v. Frazer, 100 Tex. 103, 94
S.W. 324 (1906); see also Annot., 45 A.L.R.2d 14 (1956).
9 Pnossan, ToRTs § 39 (2d ed. 1955); see Annot., 45 A.L.R.2d 14 (1956).
1 Ibid.
"1 E.g., Pennington v. Southern Pac. Co., 146 Cal. App. 2d 605, 304 P.2d 22 (1956).
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lar conduct falls short of that standard is clearly a question of fact.'2 The
determination of this fact is made by comparing the proven conduct of the
defendant attorney with the approved conduct (the standard).
Historically all negligence cases have been so determined.13 Attorney
negligence cases should be no different in this respect, and a great majority
of jurisdictions have so held. 14 This view was well expressed in Cochrane
v. Little'5 where the Maryland Supreme Court said:
In an action of this character [negligence] against an attorney, it is the duty
of the court to instruct the jury for what species or degree of negligence or
want of skill the defendant is properly answerable, and what duty is imposed
upon him by law, and leave them to determine, upon all the facts and circum-
stances of the case, whether the defendant has performed his duty, and if not,
whether the neglect or want of skill was of a character or degree such as to
render him liable, according to the definitions furnished by the instructions
of the court.'8
It is not clear from the decision in Gambert whether the court meant
that the question of attorney negligence could, in no event, be decided
by a jury. Litigants are entitled to a jury trial as a matter of right under
section 7 of article I of the California Constitution. But where the determi-
nation of the issue of negligence could not be the subject of difference
among reasonable men the court should take the question from the jury
and it is then determined as a matter of lawI 7 The constitutional guaran-
tee does not require strict adherence to the letter of the common law prac-
tice and new procedures better suited to the efficient administration of justice
may be substituted, provided there is no impairment of the substantial
features of a jury trial.'8 An essential element of such a trial is that the
issues of fact are decided by a jury.'9
The defendant in Gambert, having waived a jury trial,2 was not denied
his constitutionally guaranteed right to trial by jury. But if the court meant
that the question of attorney negligence could in no event be decided by
a jury, the result would be to deprive the attorney of his right to a jury
trial. No case so holding has been found in California, since in attorney
malpractice cases the jury has either been waived or the character of the
alleged negligent conduct has been such that reasonable men could not
differ as to its legal effect. The Gambert holding has not been questioned
on this point because as a practical matter in most attorney malpractice
suits a jury will be waived. The parties are influenced by the expense of
"2McMahon v. Kern County Union High School & College Dist., 150 Cal. App. 2d
218, 309 P.2d 465 (1957); see generally PRossan, ToiTs § 39 (2d ed. 1955); 2 WrrmN,
SummARY OF CAL noB RA LAW Torts § 213 (7th ed. 1960).
12 See James, Function of Judge and Jury in Negligence Cases, 58 YAIE L.J. 667
(1949); Thayer, Law and Fact in Jury Trials, 4 HARV. L. Bxv. 147 (1890).
14 See note 8 supra.
1571 Md. 323, 18 At. 698 (1889).
16 Id. at 326, 18 At. at 701.
17 E.g., Warner v. Santa Catalina Island Co., 44 Cal. 2d 310, 282 P.2d 12 (1955).
Is Dorsey v. Barba, 38 Cal. 2d 350, 240 P.2d 604 (1952).
'9 Ibid.
20 Trial Record, Gambert v. Hart, 44 Cal. 542 (1872).
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a jury trial and the fact that the judge, trained in the legal profession, will
usually be in a better position to evaluate an attorney's conduct than a
lay jury. So too, the defendant attorney will be influenced by the possi-
bility of minimizing publicity by waiving a jury trial. Win or lose, such
publicty is not favorable to the attorney.
The second issue decided in Gambert was that the use of expert testi-
mony on the issue of attorney negligence is not admissible. The court
merely said, "the witness was not called to prove any fact in the case, and
his evidence, if admitted, would have been only an expression of his opinion
as an attorney, that the alleged acts or omissions of the defendant amounted
to negligence in law."2 . Since where expert testimony is admissible it is
the expert's opinion that is sought,22 the court could not properly exclude
the evidence because it was merely an opinion of the witness. It appears
that the court's reasoning was that since the question of an attorney's negli-
gence is one of law and expert testimony is not admissible on questions
of law, expert testimony is not admissible on the issue of attorney negli-
gence. Since attorney negligence is not a pure question of law, if this was
the basis for excluding the expert testimony, the court in so holding was
again in error. The opinion being unclear as to the reason for the holding,
the other possible bases for excluding the testimony should be considered
before considering whether the result of excluding expert testimony is or
is not desirable.
Since the question whether particular conduct of an attorney conforms
to the standard is a question of fact it might be said that the court may
take judicial notice of the fact.2 3 The California courts have held that
judicial notice may be taken of facts that are peculiarly within the knowl-
edge of the bench and bar.24 However, it is doubtful that the question
whether particular conduct conforms to the standard of care is such a
fact as could be judicially noticed. The mere fact that experts could differ
on the question indicates that it entails such judgment as should preclude
the court from taking judicial notice of what conduct conforms to the stand-
ard of care.2 5
A second possible rationale for the decision in Gambert is that since
the judge is trained and experienced in the same field as the defendant,
he is an expert in the field and there is no need to call expert witnesses.
This view fails to recognize that although the judge may have a profes-
sional opinion as to whether certain conduct conforms to that of the reason-
2144 Cal. at 549.22E.g., People v. Flynn, 166 Cal. App. 2d 501, 333 P.2d 37 (1958); CAL. CODE Civ.
PRoc. § 1870(9); Wnr&, CALnaoa-u EviDENCE § 184 (1958).23 Some writers have proposed that the question of constructing the professional
standard of care ought to be a function of the court under an expanded theory of judi-
cial notice; see Curran, Professional Negligence-Some General Comments, in PnoFEs-
SIONAL NEGLiENCE 1 (Roady & Anderson eds. 1960); Morgan, Judicial Notice, 57
HAv. L. PRav. 269 (1944).
24People v. Adamson, 34 Cal. 2d 320, 210 P.2d 13 (1949); Estate of Costa, 109
Cal. App. 2d 735, 241 P.2d 621 (1952).25 Accord, Varcoe v. Lee, 180 Cal. 338, 181 Pac. 223 (1919); see 20 Am. Jun.
Evidence § 19 (1939).
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able attorney, his opinion is worth no more than the opinions of other
experts in the field.
Whether the parties in an attorney malpractice suit insist on a jury
trial or waive the right and try their case before the judge, expert testimony
should be not only admissible, but perhaps in some cases required. If the
jury is to determine what conduct breaches the standard of care for attor-
neys it is obvious that in appropriate cases expert testimony should be ad-
missible. A determination of the question whether a defendant has been
guilty of conduct which creates an undue risk of harm to others requires
that those who judge his conduct weigh the utility of his acts against the
probability of harm which they create.26 Therefore, whoever is to deter-
mine this question must in some way be apprised of what is reasonable
conduct for one with the skills and experience of an attorney. Where the
conduct is not within the common knowledge of the lay juror, expert testi-
mony should be admissible in order that the jury be so informed. Indeed,
where the alleged negligence arises out of the use of skills of the attorney
with which the layman is unfamiliar, expert testimony should be required
for the plaintiff to make out a case for the jury. Since the burden of proving
negligence is on the plaintiff,27 if he does not present expert testimony on
matters not within the common knowledge of the jury, he ordinarily suffers
a non-suit. In California it has been so held without question in medical
malpractice suits.28 Attorney malpractice suits should be no different in
this respect.29
Although the courts have been slow to recognize that there are special-
ists in the practice of law, modern writers have pointed to specialists30 and
even the American Bar Association has recognized their existence.3' The
district court of appeal in Lucas v. Harm2 said, "the law today has its
specialties and ...the general practitioner in law, when faced with a
26See Bohlen, Mixed Questions of Law and Fact, 72 U. PA. L. REV. 111 (1924).
27Reese v. Smith, 9 Cal. 2d 324, 70 P.2d 933 (1937); accord, CAL. CODE Cv. PRoc.
§§ 1869, 1981.28 E.g., Huffman v. Lindquist, 37 Cal. 2d 465, 234 P.2d 34, 29 A.L.R.2d 485 (1951).
29 See Citizens Loan, Fund, & Savings Ass'n of Bloomington v. Friedley, 123 Ind.
143, 23 N.E. 1075 (1890) (dictum).
20 See Dorwin, Planning a Legal Career, 42 A.B.A.J. 50, 51 (1956), where the author
states, "there are many specialties in the legal profession today. Among other fields, the
lawyer may specialize on (1) real estate, (2) wills and administration of estates, (3)
commercial law, (4) antitrust, (5) taxation, (6) patents, (7) litigation, (8) trademarks,
(9) admiralty, (10) corporate financing, (11) international law, (12) or some combina-
tion of these subjects."
3
" American Bar Association Canons of Ethics No. 45 provides: "The canons of the
American Bar Association apply to all branches of the legal profession; specialists in
particular branches are not to be considered as exempt from the application of these
principles." But see Canon No. 46: "A lawyer available to act as an associate of other
lawyers in a particular branch of the law or legal service may send to local lawyers
only and publish in his local legal journal a brief and dignified announcement of his
availability to serve other lawyers in connection therewith. The announcement should
be in a form which does not constitute a statement or representation of special experi-
ence or expertness."
32 1 Cal. Rptr. 727, 731 (1961), rev'd, 56 Cal. 2d. 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr.
821 (1961).
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problem beyond his capacities, must turn to the expert in his profession
to the end that his client is properly served."33 The judgment for the plain-
tiff was reversed on appeal, the California Supreme Court holding that
there was no evidence of negligence as a matter of law,34 implying that
even if there are specialists in the field there is no duty on the general
practitioner to consult such a specialist on his client's case. Furthermore,
since judges cannot be specialists in all fields, even though the case may
be tried without a jury expert testimony should be admissible to enlighten
the judge in the same manner as the lay jury is apprised of what is reason-
able for an attorney possessing skills and knowledge unfamiliar to the
jury members.
The discussion in the fairly recent case of Floro v. Lawton- reflects
the confusion engendered by Gambert. Citing Gambert, the court in Floro
intimated through dictum that expert testimony should not be admissible
in attorney malpractice cases because of the danger of plaguing such liti-
gation with the problems the courts and attorneys have met in the use of
expert witnesses in medical malpractice cases.30 However, none of these
problems should be considered so serious as to preclude the use of expert
opinion testimony in malpractice suits against attorneys. Though such
problems as the "conspiracy of silence" are real,37 they are not so serious
as to make good expert testimony unavailable.
One of the most serious criticisms of expert witnesses is that only those
witnesses whose testimony would be favorable are called. However, this
shortcoming can be mitigated if the court will call its own impartial experts.
In Matin Water & Power Co. v. Railroad Comm'n of California"8 the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court said, "it is now conceded that the judicial tribunals
have power to call and examine witnesses in the furtherance of justice and
against the will of either party."39 This position received statutory affrm-
ance by the California legislature.4 0 Under this procedure the court can
call impartial witnesses and the witness so called could not be accused of
identifying himself with either party.
Conclusion
In California expert testimony has not been admissible on the issue
of attorney negligence4' although such evidence is admissible in other juris-
dictions that have passed on the problem.4 2 The leading case of Gambert
v. Hart4 3 held the question of attorney negligence was one of law and that
331d. at 731.
34Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961).
35 187 Cal. App. 2d 657, 10 Cal. Rptr. 98 (1960).
361d, at 675, 10 Cal. Rptr. 107.
37 Swan, The California Law of Malpractice of Physicians, Surgeons, and Dentists,
33 CALIF. L. REv. 248 (1945).
38 171 Cal. 706, 154 Pac. 864 (1916).
39 Id. at 714, 154 Pac. at 867.
4 0 CAL. CODE CIv. l31oc. § 1871.
41See Gambert v. Hart, note 4 supra, 44 Cal. 542 (1872).
42O]son v. North, 276 Il1. App. 457 (1934); Cochrane v. Little, 71 Md. 323, 18
Atl. 698 (1889).
43Note 4 supra, 44 Cal. 542 (1872).
May, 1964] NOTES
